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1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, per capita income growth rates have ceased to con-
verge across OECD countries and there has been a surge of academic research
and policy attention about the causes underlying differences in economic growth
performance across these countries. While productivity has accelerated in some
of the most emerging economies and, most notably, in the United States, it has
substantially slowed down especially in continental Europe and Japan (OECD
[29]). Focusing on Europe, it is easily observed that since the mid-1990s, the
economic performance has experimented a significant contraction compared to
earlier periods. The economic literature developed so far has provided vari-
ous explanations for such a sclerosis (Blanchard [10], Gordon [19]). The most
commonly cited causes of the slow growth concern the rigidity of the European
economic model, the burden of taxation, the strict dependency of citizens on
the welfare system and the evidence that Europe has used some of the past pro-
ductivity improvements to increase leisure rather than income. In particular,
a wide consensus has been reached among researchers regarding the “Euro-
pean model”, which, despite its successes during the post-war era, is proving
to be inadequate now that the economic development is increasingly based on
innovation and national firms can no longer be protected from foreign com-
petition. Moreover, several studies point out that the adoption of important
general purpose technologies associated with the Information and Communi-
cation Technologies (ICT) revolution has been hindered or impeded in Europe
by an excessively regulated labor market and an insufficient level of competi-
tion (van Ark et al.[32]). Despite this productivity crisis is a common feature
of a number of European economies, remarkable differences emerge from cross
country comparisons.1
Most recently, a new strand of the literature has emerged, prospecting the
idea that a large share of the heterogeneity in productivity growth across coun-
tries (and within Europe in particular) could be attributed to the economic and
political e´lites’ capacity of managing a country (Caselli and Morelli [14], Mat-
tozzi and Merlo [26]). Along these lines of thinking, the e´lites’ responsibilities,
with respect to the institutional, social and technological delays accumulated
in the recent past, have become an issue in the European economic panorama.
Differently from this literature, our claim in this paper is that the e´lites’
responsibility does not exclusively derive from their simple tendency to maintain
the status quo. It is also due to their inability to seize the opportunity given by
new technologies and to implement the best choice for the economy as a whole, a
direct consequence of the obsolescence of their personal human capital. Indeed,
as pointed out by Messner and Polborn [27], many political or economic reforms
resemble investment projects in their return streams: initially, there is a cost to
be borne, but eventually there will be benefits. In this frame, young people will
1For example, OECD [29] reports that, compared with the previous decade, hourly labor pro-
ductivity picked up in a group of economies, including Norway, Portugal, Germany, Finland and
Sweden, while remained stable or reduced in the others.
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be able to enjoy the benefits longer and hence will be more inclined to favor
reforms than older people. It then follows that, among individuals of different
ages, the oldest ones will not be in favor of the change because they mainly
suffer the costs without being able to reap much of the benefits. Therefore
we define a gerontocratic society as a place where the decision-making process
and the political environment are dominated by the oldest individuals, with
negative consequences on economic performance in periods of rapid change and
instability, when innovation and flexibility are at a premium.
The inability of an older ruling class in managing innovation is therefore
a key feature of our research. Existing literature on labor economics provides
further support in favor of this idea. Several studies show that a negative
link between size and productivity exists and it is even more pronounced in
the ICT sector (See Daveri and Maliranta [17]). Indeed, workforce ageing is
known to entail skill deterioration and lessened ability to adapt and learn new
things. One possible explanation relies on the cognitive abilities’ tendency to
deteriorate with age. Although this decline is not uniform across abilities, after
a certain age threshold, further advancements in age are seemingly associated
with lower productivity at work. Beyond that threshold, further increases of
experience add little or nothing to the working ability of a given worker. There
are no reasons to believe that power e´lites are excluded from this process.
Along this line of reasoning, our work is also related to the literature on
interest group politics, where existing powerful interest groups may impede the
introduction of new technologies in order to protect their economic rents (Ace-
moglu and Robinson [1], Alesina and Rodrik [2], Fernandez and Rodrik [18]).
In these contributions political e´lites block technological and institutional de-
velopment because of a political replacement effect. Innovations often erode
e´lites’ incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be re-
placed. Fearing replacement, political e´lites are unwilling to initiate change
and may even block economic development. Moreover, the theoretical model
we develop belongs to the broad literature that studies the links between differ-
ent political variables and economic growth (Bellettini et al. [9], Hashimzade
and Davis [21], Hopenhayn and Muniagurria [22], Krusell and Rios-Rull [24],
Krusell et al. [25]). In particular, Hashimzade and Davis [21] provide an in-
teresting example on how political uncertainty might impede economic growth.
The main conclusion of their theoretical work is that an increase in a politi-
cal instability produces growth-reducing policies because leads governments to
invest less in activities that support human capital accumulation. Along the
same line of reasoning, through a simple model very close to the one developed
by those authors, we argue that gerontocracy, involving an elder ruling class
with a shorter life horizon, determines lower investments in human capital and
in productive public services and thereby depresses economic development.
Our aim with this paper is to study whether the aggregate economic perfor-
mance of a country can be negatively affected by the age its political e´lite. We
propose then a “toy”model in which we study how e´lites patience influences the
adoption of growth promoting policies. We conjecture that older e´lites are more
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impatient, i.e. have a lower subjective discount. The goal of the model is to
highlight the mechanism that originates investments in education and produc-
tive government spending.2 For the same reason we do not allow for any other
differences (e.g. ideologies, organization, etc.) between the e`lites’ that alternate
in the office. Although we are aware that such an approach could sound over-
simplified, we are confident that this parsimonious conceptualization is suitable
to isolate the effect that politicians preferences (induced by their age) has per
se on growth.
Through our simple model, we show that a more impatient ruling class,
whose interests are less devoted to long-term delayed return on investment, may
weaken the human capital accumulation process because of inadequate public
education policies and may hinder private sector productivity growth because of
poor expenditure in productive services. We conjecture that the term structure
of e´lites subjective discount rates displays a decreasing pattern. In this sense,
we argue that gerontocracy is harmful for growth. Using standard comparative
statics analysis, we derive testable restrictions on the growth reduced form
equation that we test in the empirical part of the paper. To measure the impact
of politicians age on economic growth, we combine information from a group
of European countries on socio-economic characteristics and background of the
political e´lites which we identify with the parliamentarians with information
from a rich industry-level data set. Our main goal is to exploit differences in
politicians age across countries to estimate the effect that gerontocracy exerts
on the allocation of public spending on productive investments and thus on
economic growth.
The plan of the article is the following. Section 2 lays out the baseline
model and discusses the links among the e´lites’ patience, public investments
and economic growth. Our main conclusion is that a gerontocracy, which is
characterized by a higher impatience, is an important source of innovation-
retarding policies and therefore depresses economic development. Therefore, it
can be seen as plausible explanations of the growth differentials across countries.
Section 3 discusses the data. Due to limitations on the availability of political
data, we have not been able to extend the analysis to all EU countries. The
countries involved in our study are Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Germany
and UK that, anyway, represents a large share of the European economy and
population. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis, and our focus is to show
how the performances recorded by a group of European countries, whose po-
litical structures are often characterized by leaders who are significantly older
than most of the adult population, can be explained once this peculiarity is
recognized. The empirical results are consistent with the model theoretical
predictions. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2This paper is not an attempt to explain what is at the origin of a gerontocratic society. This
implies that, for us, the (average) age of the ruling class is not an endogenous variable. The analysis
of this phenomenon is on our research agenda but is out of the scope of this exercise. Here we
conjecture that a link between gerontocracy and subjective discount exists and try to explain the
effect of this on productivity growth.
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2 Theoretical model
In this section we present a simple theoretical model that extends the framework
proposed by Hashimzade and Davis [21] by taking into account the role of public
productive service, along with the public investment in education, as engine of
the human capital accumulation.
Demography . In a discrete-time t ∈ {0, 1, . . .∞} economy, a continuum of
measure 1 of consumers/workers who lives forever produces a single homogenous
good. Similar to Glomm and Ravikumar [20], in each period agents allocate
their time between education (e) and production (1− e).
Technology . Production function requires the use of human capital and
government purchases and takes the form:
Yt = AG
η
t [(1− e)Ht]1−η (1)
where A > 0 is the constant social marginal return of human capital, (1− e)Ht
is the stock of human capital at time t (i.e. efficiency of labor hour), Gt is the
productive government spending (e.g. the provision of productive services, the
roll-out and adoption of broadband, antitrust legislation, etc) available at the
beginning of period t and 0 < η < 1.3
Human capital accumulation is determined according to the following pro-
duction function:
Ht+1 = Ht + φ(Ht, Et) (2)
where - without loss of generality - no depreciation is assumed, Et is the public
investment in education and φ is the learning technology described by the
following homothetic function:
φ(Ht, Et) = eζH
α
t E
1−α
t (3)
with ζ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. Output is taxed at fixed rate τ . This implies that
the following condition, representing the government budget constraint, must
hold:
τYt = Gt + Et + (R
g
t +R
r
t ) = σgtτYt + σetτYt + (1− σgt − σet)τYt (4)
with (σgt + σet) < 1 ∀t, where σgt and σet are the share of revenues allocated
to finance productive government spending and public education, respectively.
It then follows that the share (1−σgt−σet) is used to finance expenditure that
produces no benefit for the community and it can be seen as private benefit
(or appropriation of tax revenues) enjoyed by the e´lites. We denote with Rgt
the government rent, enjoyed by the politicians in charge, and with Rrt the
retirement rent, received in the case of electoral loss. We assume that the
retirement rent is constant and lower than Rgt , with R
r
t < R
g
t − Rrt . Finally,
Cpt = (1− τ)Yt is consumed by the consumers/workers.
3The public factor in equation (1) is a common external input. That is G is a pure public good.
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Political environment . We assume that all the politicians in the office
belong to the same generation. This simplification allows to consider each
Government as a single individual of age a. We consider an environment where
two parties randomly alternate in office. To keep matter simple, we assume
that the two parties face the same exogenous probability pi of being voted
out and replaced. At each time t the government in charge chooses σgt and
σet. At time zero, political e´lite knows their status 0 ∈ {l, w}. When  = l
the incumbent government has lost the election. We assign at this event a
positive probability pi. At the opposite, with probability (1 − pi),  = w and
the incumbent government remains in charge. In the former case ( = l) the
political e´lite receives a retirement rent Rr, while in the latter ( = w) it
allocates again tax revenues between productive government spending, public
education and its own (unproductive) rent.
2.1 The optimization process
The political e´lite belonging to the “government in charge”maximizes:
θU(Rgt ) + (1− θ)U(Cpt ) (5)
where U is the strictly concave twice differentiable per-period utility, Rgt ≡
(1−σgt−σet)τYt is the government rent, Cpt is the private consumption, and θ is
the weight the government assigns to government rent and private consumption;
therefore it can be interpreted as a measure of politicians’ “selfishness”(i.e. the
higher is θ, the higher is the degree of “selfishness”). Notice that, in this
environment, the controls σg and σe at date t depend only on the current state
H, so that σgt = σg(Ht) and σet = σe(Ht). This implies that any given policy
generates a stochastic law of motion for the state:
Ht+1 = Ξ (Ht, σgt, σet) (6)
which will be stationary if σg and σe are stationary.
Following the standard notation used in literature, let denote the variables
at time t and t+ 1 as those without and with primes. The functional equation
associated to the maximization problem faced by a government in charge at the
beginning of period t is
V (H, ) = max
σe,σg
{[
θU(Rg) + (1− θ)U(Cp)
]
+ βE
[
V
(
H
′
, 
′) |ε]} (7)
s.t
Y = Y = AGη [(1− e)H]1−η
H0 > 0
H
′
= Ξ (H,σg, σe, )
C = (1− τ)Y
Rg =
{
(1− σg − σe)τY if  = w
Rr if  = l
(8)
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where β is the is the subjective discount factor: β = 1/(1+ρ) where ρ is the rate
of time preference; at time t = 0 H0 is pre-determined, R
g
0 and H1 are chosen,
and the uncertainty is due to the risk of an electoral loss in the subsequent
period. It than follow that associated with the solution (7) is a policy vector
defined by Ψ = {(σg1, σe1), (σg2, σe2), . . . }. Notice that the value function (7)
is the present discount value of the incumbent ruling class evaluated along the
optimal program.
As previously mentioned, Rr indicates the retirement rent gained in case of
electoral loss. Since we are focusing on the burden that gerontocracy places on
the economic performance, it seems reasonable to assume that the role played
by the retirement rent - whose benefits can actually be enjoyed over a short
period of time - in the political e´lites’ decision process is negligible. Therefore
we assume that Rr is a constant and lower than (1− σg − σe)τY .
The following assumptions are maintained for the remainder of this section.
Assumption 1 H ∈ H ⊂ R, (σg + σe) ∈ (0, 1) and E,G ∈ A ⊂ R.
Assumption 2 U : X → R is a strictly increasing, twice continuously differ-
entiable and concave utility function, with U ′(0) =∞ and U ′(∞) = 0.
Assumption 3 Retirement rent Rrt < 1/2R
g
t .
2.2 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Here we are interested into analyzing the long-run effects of gerontocracy.
Therefore, we focus on the stationary equilibrium which involves time-invariant
decision rules in the infinite horizon. This concept uses a recursive representa-
tion of the political e´lites’ problem.
Definition 1 Given the initial H0 and Ht ∈ Γ(Ht−1) ⊂ H, with Γ continuous
and compact-valued, a Balaced Growth Path (hereafter BGP) for the economy
is a collection of sequences {H,Y,Cp, Rg, σg, σe, G,E, e}∞t=0 such that:
i) H evolves according to (6);
ii) government budget is balanced, τYt = Gt + Et +R
g
t ;
iii) politicians solve problem (7-8).
Let now Vl denote the value of an electoral loss, which occurs with proba-
bility pi, and Vw the value of being (re)electeded, which occurs with probability
(1−pi). Then the optimal value function V for the political e´lites’ optimization
problem (7-8) is obtained as solution to the following Bellman equation:
V (H) = max
{σe,σg}∞t=0
[
θU(Rg(H))+(1−θ)U(Cp(H))
]
+β
[
piVl(H
′
)+(1−pi)Vw(H ′)
]}
(9)
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subject to (8).
With interior equilibrium, the first order conditions and the envelope con-
dition for the political e´lites’ problem are respectively:
[FOC]
∂V
∂σg
= 0⇒ ∂U
∂σg
+ β
[
pi
∂Vl
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σg
+ (1− pi)∂Vw
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σg
]
= 0(10)
[FOC]
∂V
∂σe
= 0⇒ ∂U
∂σg
+ β
[
pi
∂Vl
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σe
+ (1− pi)∂Vw
∂H ′
∂H
′
∂σe
]
= 0(11)
[ENV ]
∂Vl
∂H
=
∂U(R)
∂H
;
∂Vw
∂H
∂
∂H
[
θU(Rg) + (1− θ)U(Cp)
]
(12)
Conditions (10)-(12), together with the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞ (β)
t ∂U(·)
∂H
Ht = 0 (13)
and the initial condition of the economy fully characterize the solution of the
political e´lites’ problem.
Finally, the assumption of identical governments implies that they choose
the same optimal level of σe and σg, which is constant along the BGP where
all the per capita variables grow at the same rate given by
γ = ζe
[
A1/(1−η)σeση/(1−η)g τ (1− e)
]1−α
(14)
Simple algebra provides the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Along the BGP, the growth rate of per capita variables is in-
creasing in the amount of tax revenues used to finance education and productive
services:
∂γ
∂σe
∣∣∣∣
BGP
> 0 and
∂γ
∂σg
∣∣∣∣
BGP
> 0
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Recalling that along BGP, H
′
= H(1 + γ), proposition 1 also implies:
∂H
′
∂σe
= H
(
1− α
σe
)
γ (15)
∂H
′
∂σg
= H
(
1− α
1− η
η
σg
)
γ (16)
Finally, in order to obtain explicit solutions for σe and σg and do some
comparative statics, we assume now that the politicians’ preferences are loga-
rithmic. Solving (10-12) with respect σg and σe yields:
σ∗g = η
β (1− pi) (1− α)
θ + β (1− pi) (1− α) , (17)
σ∗e = (1− η)
β (1− pi) (1− α)
θ + β (1− pi) (1− α) . (18)
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Proposition 2 Along the BGP, the optimal government spending in produc-
tive services σ∗g and education σ∗e decline with politicians’ impatience. Thus,
the more impatient is the political e´lite the lower is the equilibrium growth rate
γ.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Overall, the main task of our “toy”model is to isolate the optimizing be-
havior of the political e´lites. A political e´lite behaves as a single agent and
solves an optimization problem over an infinite horizon. In order to be able
to analyze our main question in a meaningful way, we first solve the e´lites’
optimization problem. This allows to identify a link between the subjective
discount rate of the cabinet in charge (β) and the policies implemented. Then
we added an aggregate technology that ensures a perpetual growth driven by
productive government services and investment in education. The provision of
both government services and public education is financed by a tax on income,
whose revenues are also used to finance the e´lites’ unproductive rent Rg that
they receive in case of electoral loss. As it will be more clear in the follow-
ing paragraph, this assumption is crucial to highlight the trade-off faced by
the policy maker and the role of gerontocracy. Each rational government will
choose the amount of tax revenues to invest in innovation and education that
will guarantee a rent Rg as large as possible, under the uncertainty of being
re-elected in the subsequent election.
The way we bring the toy model to the data is the following. We conjecture
that the patience (which negatively affects the subjective discount rate) decline
with age.4 This implies that an older e´lite weights future returns less and,
therefore, is the more reluctant to adopt potential growth enhancing policies.
If this conjecture on the linkage between politicians age and their discount factor
is correct, then public investments do respond to changes in the ruling class
age structure, which affect the size of the unproductive rent enjoyed by the lite.
The empirical content of proposition 2 is then that the older the political lite,
the lower the public resources devoted to productive services and education,
human capital accumulation declines and economic growth slows considerably.
3 The data
The data used in the empirical analysis have been collected from different
sources. In what follows we provide a description of the data and discuss the
procedures adopted to merge data from different sources in a single dataset.
The first source is the DataCube dataset, obtained from the EURELITE
network, that collects information on personal characteristics of national par-
liamentarians in several European countries from 1983 to 2004.5 DataCube
4Laboratory and field studies of time preference identify a decreasing slope in the term structure
of subjective discount rates (see Angeletos et al. [3] among the others).
5For more information on the EURELITE network see the following web page address:
http://www.eurelite.uni-jena.de/eurelite/portrait/introduction.html.
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includes about fifty variables related to the social and political background of
national parliaments members. Unfortunately this dataset does not provide
any information on governments’ member age. Therefore, in our empirical ex-
ercise, we proxy gerontocracy with the average age of the members of national
parliaments of each country.6 Beyond some basic socio-demographic variables
(i.e., occupation, education, age and sex), the dataset includes also information
on politicians’ background, with particular attention to the pre-parliamentary
political experience, including political and administrative appointments at lo-
cal level (town, county, and region), parliamentary career (i.e., age at entry into
parliament and the number of elections for which they had stood successfully),
leading party functions, and government appointments.
The second source is represented by the EU-KLEMS dataset, which contains
variables measuring output, productivity, employment (skilled and unskilled),
physical capital, ICT investments and technological change at industry level, for
all European Union member states from 1970 onwards.7 At the lowest level of
aggregation, data were collected for 71 industries. The industries are classified
according to the European NACE revision 1 classification. Since the level of
detail varies across countries, industries and variables due to data limitations,
we choose a level of aggregation that produced 25 industries, which for our
purposes have been further grouped into 6 “macro”sectors (Manufacturing,
Electrical machinery and telecommunication, Finance and business services,
Retail and distribution services, Personal and social services, and other goods
producing industries).8 The availability of data at industry level is extremely
important for our analysis, as we believe that the relationship between the
level of gerontocracy, investments in ICT and economic growth may be quite
heterogeneous across the many sectors of the economy. Industry level data
will then be able to capture such heterogeneity better than aggregate measure,
such as the per capita GDP. EU-KLEMS also provides information on the so-
called “non-market economy”. This aggregate includes data from the following
sub-sectors: public administration, education, health and social services. In
our regressions, we proxy the public ICT investment by the sum of the ICT
investments undertaken by those sub-sector.
As the number of countries covered and the time span length of the EU-
KLEMS are both larger than those available in the EURELITE dataset, the
merging procedure of these two sources has produced a sample that includes
7 countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and
6We do not think that using the (average) age of the parliamentarians rather than that of the
government members matters for our exercise. In fact, we did not find any argument in support to
the idea that, at country level, there exists a significant difference in terms of age between these two
groups of politicians.
7For more information on the EU-KLEMS dataset the interested reader can refer to the following
web page: http://www.euklems.net/.
8We decided to keep the electrical machinery and telecommunication sector separated from the
aggregated manufacturing sector because we believe that in this sector the correlation between
investment in ICT and TFP growth could be particularly relevant.
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UK) and 25 industries, with a time span ranging from 1983 to 2004, for a to-
tal of 3,500 potential observations. However, as for some variable - like gross
operating surplus - data are missing in the early years in some countries, the
actual sample consists of 3,416 observations. Finally, we have added a variable
accounting for public expenditure on education at country level, as provided
by EUROSTAT and UNESCO.9 For our purposes, this variable has been stan-
dardized with respect to GDP. However, since we do not have information on
the German public education expenditure before the pre-unification period, in
our empirical analysis we split our sample in two sub-samples. The first sub-
sample, made of 2,916 observations, spans the whole period from 1984 up to
2004 and includes data from all country but Germany. The second sub-sample,
made of 1,485 observations, spans the sub-period from 1995 up to 2004, but
includes data from Germany. Finally, we obtain a sub-sample of control, made
of 1,269 observations, that spans the sub-period from 1995 up to 2004, but does
not include Germany.
Table 1 reports all summary statistics. According to our data, only 21%
of the national representatives are female and the average age is about 58
years, with France showing the oldest parliament and The Netherlands the
youngest (see figure 1 for a detailed picture of the cross country differences in life
expectancy and politicians’ age in the sample). About 60% of parliamentarians
in the sample has a university degree. Furthermore, about 60% of them had a
previous local/regional background activity in terms of being a representative
elected by citizens and about 60% have been elected in the same place of origin.
Concerning the economic data, we see that workers with average skills ac-
count for about two thirds of total hours worked, with low skilled and high
skilled workers that follows. In particular, high skilled workers account for only
13% of total hours (see table2).
For a better understanding of our data and the relationships among them,
we have also computed unconditional correlation coefficients between gerontoc-
racy and TFP growth and between ICT (both private and public) and TFP
growth. In table 3 the (n,m) cell shows the average correlation between the
TFP growth of industry n and the level of gerontocracy attributed to country
m. The general negative impact exerted by gerontocracy is quite transparent
when looking at the last row of the table, which reports the correlation column
average by country. In particular, this detrimental effect seems to be stronger
the higher is the technological complexity of the industry, being larger in the
Electrical machinery and telecommunication sector. Notice that (on average)
the older are the politicians the larger are the negative correlations. As sug-
gested by our theoretical model, a positive correlation between public ICT and
TFP growth should emerge from the data, with the former positively affect-
ing the latter and being complement with the private ICT. The unconditional
correlation coefficients reported in table 5 seem to confirm our theoretical pre-
9Data source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu for the period 1995-2004 and
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/default.aspx for the period 1983-1994.
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dictions, with public ICT and TFP strongly correlated, and with public and
private investments in ICT being complement (see figure 2 where we plot the
(log of) public and private ICT). Finally, in table 6 we observe the correlation
between private ICT and TFP. Even in this case the positive correlation seems
to hold and it is stronger in those sectors where we expect ICT to be a major
driver for TFP.
Finally, a different picture emerges if we look at the correlation between
the (log of the) age of the newcomers (which provides a measure of the demo-
graphic dimension of the political turnover) in each national Parliament and
the TFP growth. The results reported in table 4 suggest that the problem
is not the politicians’ age sic et simpliciter. In comparison with the previous
table, correlations are much more tenuous and, often, are positive. A possible
explanation could be that older newcomers, during their working life (presum-
ably in the private sector), have acquired skills and competences that (partially
or completely) compensate the human capital obsolescence due to ageing.
4 The empirical model
In this section we present the empirical strategy used to test the main hy-
pothesis of our theoretical model, namely that gerontocracy negatively affects
economic growth due to its incapacity to provide sufficient investments in in-
novation (public and private) and education. However, as we lack adequate
information on education expenditure, we limit the empirical analysis to the
study of the effect of gerontocracy on innovation, thus assuming that the level
of expenditure in education is given.10 Therefore, our empirical model will be
specified to estimate the impact of gerontocracy on public productive invest-
ments and, only indirectly, on the TFP growth.
The primary econometric strategy discussed here is based on a reduced form
three equations system while alternative approaches will be assessed in section
5.3. The toy model is used to provide restrictions on the number of equations,
the choice of the endogenous variables and the set of regressors. First of all,
since the model describes an economy where growth is driven by productive
government spending (which we identified with the public investment in ICT)
10Unfortunately, homogeneous and comparable data on education expenditure at country level is
available only in aggregate, thus preventing us from distinguishing expenditures at different levels of
education. In fact, we expect that expenditure at lower levels of education, although important for
the economic growth, may be positively related with gerontocracy that, in fact, could be aligned with
vested interests of teacher unions for preserving a status quo where insiders obtain all the benefits,
without caring about quality. On the contrary, the financing of higher education and research
activities may be much less correlated with gerontocracy as it usually leads to breakthroughs and
innovations that are not in line with the idea of maintaining the status quo of a gerontocratic system.
Based on simple descriptive statistics, our data do not show any correlation between gerontocracy
and public expenditure on education.
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and public education, the TFP growth equation can be expressed as:
log(tfpijt) = α0 + α1log(pexpedu)jt + α2log(ict)ijt−1 + α3log(gict)jt−1 +(19)
+α4du95 + α5du95 · log(ict)ijt−1 + α6Sijt−1 + α7Xjt + ηijt
where, i is the sector, j is the country and t is time, and where tfp is the TFP
growth index, pexpedu is the public expenditure on education, ict is the private
ICT capital service, while gict is the public ICT capital service. Furthermore, S
is a vector of sector-specific variables (share of labor input with different skills
and share of workers with different age) and X is a vectors of other controls
at country level, such as market openness and country dummies. Following
the empirical evidence reported in van Ark et al. [32] and Dahl et al. [16],
we include in our TFP equation the dummy variable (du95) and its interaction
with ict to captures a structural break that could have changed the productivity
trend from 1995 onward.
Furthermore, since the toy model has showed that older politicians are more
willing to pursue an (unproductive) rent rather than public investment, because
of their shorter lifespan and hence lower incentive to accumulate public capital,
we added the following equation to link this kind of productive public spending
with the set of gerontocracy related variables:
log(gictjt) = γ0 + γ1log(pexpedu)jt + γ2log(gerontocracy)jt−1 + (20)
+γ3log(newcomers)jt−1 + γ4backgroundit−1 + γ5log(female)jt−1 +
+γ6Sijt + γ7Xjt + ξijt
where gerontocracy is the politicians’ mean age, newcomers is the mean age
of the politicians who get in office for the first time, background is the percent-
age of politicians with local/regional political background and female is the
percentage of female politicians.
Finally, the interaction between private ICT and public ICT has been cap-
tured by:
log(ictijt) = β0 + β1log(pexpedu)jt + β2log(gict)jt + β3Sijt + (21)
+β4Xjt + εijt
To avoid potential endogeneity problems between TFP growth and ICT vari-
ables, whenever reasonable, regressors have been lagged one period while the
potential endogeneity between ICT variables and gerontocracy has been con-
trolled through the use of country dummies, which should wipe out all the time
invariant unobserved heterogeneity at country level.
Given our system of equations (19) - (21), we can easily see that gerontoc-
racy affects private ICT only through the public ICT (gict). At the same time,
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gerontocracy affects TFP through both the private and public ICT. Therefore,
the total effect of gerontocracy on TFP is given by the following relationship:
∂TFP
∂gerontocracy
= (α3γ2) + (α2 + α5du95)β2γ2
where the first term on the right side of the equation reflects the (direct) effect
of gerontocracy on TFP through the public ICT investment and the second
term is the (indirect) effect through the private ICT investment.
As we assume a recursive structure for our empirical model, the parameters
have been estimated using SUR technique (Zellner [33], Zellner and Huang
[34] and Zellner [35]). In what follows, we start presenting the results obtained
pooling all countries and sectors and later we discuss the results obtained fitting
our model by sector or by country.
5 The empirical results
In this section we present and comment the empirical results of our analysis.
We first discuss the results obtained with the pooled data (all sectors and
countries). Then we introduce and compare the results by sector and country.
Finally, we present some robustness check analyses that should help reinforce
the conclusion of our study. All analyses have been carried out using the three
different samples discussed in section 3.
5.1 Estimates from the pooled data
Table 7 presents the estimates of the parameters in equations (19) - (21) for
the pooled data, using the three samples. Overall, the results clearly corrobo-
rate our theoretical predictions, with the gerontocracy variable that negatively
affects public ICT, that in turn affects TFP. This result is robust across sub-
samples. Furthermore, and coherently with our theoretical predictions, geron-
tocracy affects TFP mainly through the public ICT investment channel. In
fact, as can be seen in the top panel of table 8, using the pooled data, a 1% in-
crease in the level of gerontocracy reduces the TFP index of an amount ranging
from 0.314% to 0.438%, depending on the sample employed. By disentangling
the total effect into its direct and indirect components, we note that the direct
effect is what really drives the result. Finally, by comparing the different sam-
ples we notice also that the negative effect of gerontocracy has increased over
time (by comparing the sample 1 across the two periods) and it seems to have
an important effect in Germany (by comparing sample 1 and sample 2 across
the same period).
Consistently with the idea that the attitude to innovate declines with the
politicians’ age, from table 7 we see that past experience of political government
at local/regional level (background) seems to be negatively related with gict.
In particular, it affects negatively and significantly the TFP growth index in
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sub sample 2 and 3 (with elasticity equal to -0.435 and -0.855 respectively), i.e.
when the role of public ICT capital is stronger, while its effect is positive but
light (with elasticity 0.196) in sample 1, when the impact of gict on TFP is
relatively smaller. This may be partly explained by thinking that being elected
to national parliament can be seen as the culmination of a political career spent
largely at local or regional level. Under this perspective, background proxies
politicians’ age and therefore the same argument used for gerontocracy can be
applied to explain its effect on productive public spending.
Our estimates document also a that public ICT capital is a main determi-
nant of the TFP growth index. The parameter of gict is positive and significant
in each sample, it is definitely greater than that of the private ICT. In partic-
ular, the contribution of the private ICT is positive and not significant when
the time horizon is longer (i.e. sample 1), while it is negative and significant
when we focus on the last decade of our dataset, irrespective of the presence of
Germany in the dataset. This result is consistent with the literature on TFP
growth in the European countries. In fact, along a time span similar to the
one taken into account in the present analysis, Van Ark et al.[32] show that the
effect of private ICT on TFP growth for the continental European countries is
zero up to the mid-1980s, significantly negative until the 1991-1996 period and
again zero after that, leading the authors to conclude that ICT has at best had
no effect on TFP index.
Estimates document also the substitutability between ICT (public and pri-
vate) capital and non-ICT capital (nict), which enters in the TFP equation
with a negative (and significant) parameter in all the (two of the three) sam-
ples employed. Furthermore, they show that over the whole period the TFP
growth index increases with the share of medium skilled workers (hhms), while
all employees contribute to the investment in private and public ICT (with
some differences). On the contrary, when we consider the shorter samples, high
skilled workers never play a role.
Similarly to what happens in the political arena, our estimates suggest also
that age affects the contribution of the workforce (i.e. the labor productivity)
to the TFP and private ICT, given that the parameter associated to younger
ages ( h29 and h49) is generally greater than the one associated to h+50. The
worker age does not seem to have an effect on the public ICT equation.
Finally, looking at education (the second channel through which gerontocracy
may affect economic performance according to our theoretical model), our re-
sults do not support the idea that public expenditure on education - whose
limits we have previously described - unambiguously enhance TFP. Regressions
ran with alternative aggregate measure (i.e. the share on the total public ex-
penditure, TPE) confirm that, regardless the proxy employed, the final impact
of pexpedu on TFP growth is rather inconclusive.
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5.2 Estimates using data by sector and countries
The results presented so far, although interesting, provide only an aggregate
picture of the relationship between gerontocracy, ICT and TFP. However, we
know that it can be highly heterogeneous across the many sectors of the econ-
omy and/or by country. As already discussed in the previous sections, some of
the relationship between ICT and TFP may be stronger or weaker depending
on the specific sector/country where they apply. Therefore, in what follow we
first present elasticity results obtained splitting our pooled samples by sector
and later we comment on the results by country.11
Table 8 provides the elasicities of TFP growth with respect to gerontocracy
by sector. The main result that emerges looking across the sectors is that
the more ITC intensive is the sector, the stronger is the total effect exerted by
gerontocracy on TFP growth. In particular “Electrical machinery and TC”and
“Manufacturing”have been characterized by the higher direct effect via gict
(with significant elasticities in the range from -0.385 up to -0.962). Second,
consistently with estimates of the pooled regressions, the elasticities estimated
in the sub sample 2 have been generally higher than the ones referred to sub
sample 1: in particular we find high and significant elasticities in “Finance and
business services”(-0.602) and in “Personal and social services”(-0.711).
Finally elasticities computed by country, reported in table 9, show that the
loss in terms of TFP growth has been particularly relevant in UK (-1.611) and
Italy (-4.160) while even dramatic in Germany and Finland, where the esti-
mated elasticities of TFP growth with respect to our measure of gerontocracy
have been greater than 14% and 17%, respectively.12
5.3 Robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of our results to different model specifications,
in this section we briefly present all the alternatives we have estimated and
compare the results with our baseline specifications presented in the previous
section.13
Our first robustness check has been devoted to analyze the role of gerontoc-
racy variables as regressors in the private ICT equation (21). In fact, although
according to our theoretical model the set of gerontocracy related variables
should not affect private ICT, we have run a model specification that includes
them. Results have shown that these variables are never statistically significant
and, in any case, the magnitude of the parameter estimates has always been
very low across samples, sectors and countries.
11The full set of parameter estimates by sector and country are available upon request by authors.
12These results must be interpreted with caution since, differently from pooled and sector esti-
mates, country estimates are not robust to changes in the definition of the sample.
13As our results are robust to the alternative specifications used, for sake of brevity we do not
present and discuss in detail all the parameter estimates. However, they are available upon request
by authors.
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We have further checked if alternative specifications, involving gerontocracy
variable interactions and politicians’ background variables could have had an
effect on the overall results. According to our results, adding these interactions
produces slightly less accurate estimates, but the main results do not change
significantly with respect to those reported in the previous section. This effect
has been noticed in particular in the estimates by sector and by country, and in
our view this should simply reflect a problem of efficiency (due to small sample
size in presence of an increased number of parameters to be estimated).
As a further robustness check we have also estimated a model in which the
lagged logarithm of private ICT enters as regressor in the gict equation. While
the overall results and economic conclusions do not change, it is interesting to
note that with this new specification there is a strong feedback effect between
ict and gict, self reinforcing each other. No change is observed in terms of
gerontocracy effect on TFP.
We have also adjusted gerontocracy and newcomers for country specific life
expectancy, in order to account for different interpretations of the politicians’
age according to country specific social norms imposed by different country
average age. Actually, this is a further way to control for endogeneity. All
results are fully confirmed in terms of sign, magnitude and significance.
Moreover, as our education variable does not produce convincing results, we
have estimated our model using a measure of education expenditure obtained as
ratio to Total Public Expenditure (TPE) rather than to GDP. Even in this case,
education appears to affect private and public ICT not in an unambiguous way,
while the results in terms of gerontocracy remain in line with those presented
in the previous section.
We have also addressed the issue of potential endogeneity between ict, gict
and tfp. In fact, and in line with the economic mechanisms emphasized in
the theoretical part of the paper, the SUR estimates were obtained under the
assumption of a recursive structure, in which the ICT variables enters the TFP
equation and no feedback is allowed. Under this setting the parameters of
the system (19)-(21) can be consistently estimated by separate estimation of
each equation by the 2SLS estimator, using as instruments (for each equation)
the set of predetermined/exogenous RHS variables. A comparison between the
elasticities obtained using the SUR and the 2SLS estimation is presented in the
top panel of table (10). As we can see, 2SLS estimation produces elasticities,
which are statistically significant and in line with our theory. As a further
robustness check, we explicitly allow for TFP feedbacks to exist, i.e. we include
the (log of) TFP index at time t between the regressors of equations (20) and
(21) as follows:
log(gictjt) = γ0 + γ1log(tfp)ijt + γ2log(pexpedu)jt + (22)
+γ3log(gerontocracy)jt−1 + γ4log(newcomers)jt−1 +
+γ5backgroundit−1 + γ6log(female)jt−1 + γ7Sijt + γ8Xjt + ξijt
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log(ictijt) = β0 + β1log(tfp)ijt + β2log(pexpedu)jt + β3log(gict)jt +(23)
+β4Sijt + β5Xjt + εijt
The elasticity results from this new model are reported in the second panel of
table (10), and have been obtained estimating the system of equations (19, 22,
23) using SUR, 2SLS and 3SLS estimators. As before, we used as instruments
the full set of predetermined/exogenous variables in the three equations. If
the system of equations is properly specified, then 3SLS is more efficient than
2SLS.14 However, in our case the estimates from 2SLS and 3SLS are dramati-
cally different. In particular, while the elasticities obtained via 2SLS are both
consistent with the theoretical model and statistically significant, those pro-
duced by the 3SLS estimator are not in line with the theory and non significant
in two of the three samples analyzed and this may likely due to a misspecifi-
cation problem in one of the equations. In this case, the 2SLS estimates are
definitely more reliable than those produced by 3SLS. In fact, as highlighted
by Baltagi [4] p.272, if there is a misspecification problem, the 2SLS will not
contaminate the remaining parts of the model. On the contrary, the 3SLS bias
is instead transmitted everywhere.
As a final robustness check, we estimate the system of equations (19)-(21),
removing the one-period lags for all the RHS variables. Although we observe a
slight attenuation in the magnitudes moving from SUR to 3SLS, these estimates
provide a further support in favour of our theory.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we argue that when relatively young people cease to be the en-
gine of an economy, long-run economic growth is endangered. Over the last
three decades, many European economies have fallen into an old-age trap, a
self-reinforcing mechanism whereby e´lites, generally the most aged individuals,
have used control of the political system to exclude new generations, who are
reasonably the most dynamic and innovative part of the population, from the
access to power.
While we do not analyze this mechanism formally (i.e. we do not explain
what are the determinants of gerontocracy), nor we do focus on some possible
“positive”consequences that gerontocracy may have on a society as a whole, for
example in reducing the inequalities, we focus our effort to explore the possible
linkages between the age of the ruling class and the long-run growth rates both
theoretically and empirically.
14Just as reminder, 3SLS, which relies on the assumption that errors are homoskedastic but
correlated across equations, is a combination of 2SLS and SUR. Indeed, it allows to tackle the
presence of endogenous variables on both the LHS and RHS of the equations (i.e., the 2SLS part), and
the cross equation correlation of the error terms (i.e., the SUR part that guarantees the efficiency).
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To achieve this goal, we have developed a simple endogenous growth model
where the long-run growth rate is directly affected by public productive services
and public investment in education. Moving from the conjecture that an older
e´lites displays a higher impatience rate, the main testable hypothesis derived
from our theoretical model is that the older the ruling class, the lower the public
investment in education and productive services.
The empirical analysis corroborates these findings. Estimates indicates that,
on average, a decrease of gerontocracy increases unambiguously the TFP, with
elasticities ranging between -0.314% and -0.438%, depending on the sample
employed. Furthermore, we find gerontocracy affects TFP mainly via gict, i.e
what we called “direct effect”is always negative, and this result holds using
both the pooled data or the data by country and sector. Also, the negative
effect of gerontocracy on TFP growth is stronger in those sectors, such as
electrical machinery and TC, retail service and manufacturing, where the ICT
is expected to be essential. Finally, our estimates tell that the consequences of
gerontocracy have been more severe in Germany, Finland and Italy, compared
to the other European countries included in our sample. In terms of sign these
results are robust to different alternative model specifications and estimators,
although sometime the magnitudes of the effect have changed.
Finally, in terms of our future agenda, there are several extensions to our
approach that are worth pursuing. In the theoretical model for instance, we
introduce several assumptions aimed at obtaining an analytical friendly frame-
work. The next step will be to test how robust these results are when these
simplifications are relaxed. In particular, we plan to address in a subsequent
work the formal attempt to endogenize the gerontocracy. Moreover, from an
empirical standpoint we delegate to a further paper the extension of our data
set in order to include information on the managers employed in the private
sector.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Along the BGP:
Yt+1 − Yt
Yt
∣∣∣∣
BGP
≡ γ =
[
A (τσgA)
η
1−η (1− e) η1−η
]
(Ht+1 −Ht)− 1 (24)
Recalling that Et = σ
eτYt and Gt = σgτYt, we obtain:
γ = eζ
[
τσeA
1
1−η (τσg(1− e)η)
η
1−η
]1−α
Differrentiating γ w.r.t. σe and σg yields:
∂γ
∂σe
= eζ
(
σeτ A
1
1−η (τ σg (1− e)η)
η
1−η
)1−α (1− α)
σe
> 0 (25)
∂γ
∂σg
= eζ
(
σeτ A
1
1−η (τ σg (1− e)η)
η
1−η
)1−α (1− α) η
(1− η)σg > 0 (26)
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
dσ∗g
dβ
= η
β (1− pi) (1− α)
[θ + β (1− pi) (1− α)]2 > 0
dσ∗e
dβ
= (1− η) β (1− pi) (1− α)
[θ + β (1− pi) (1− α)]2 > 0
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Table 2: Hours worked by person engaged: by sector, 1983-2004
Sector High skilled Medium skilled Low skilled
1 10.03 % 66.64 % 23.33 %
2 8.51 % 63.16 % 28.33 %
3 23.19 % 62.49 % 14.35 %
4 6.51 % 67.51 % 25.98 %
5 12.18 % 62.04 % 25.78 %
6 9.13 % 64.83 % 26.04 %
avg 11.59 % 64.44 % 23.97 %
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 -
Personal and social services, 6 - Other goods producing industries.
Table 3: Correlation between TFP growth index and Gerontocracy, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
sector
1 -0.521 0.129 -0.179 -0.645 -0.444 -0.741 -0.635 -0.434
2 0.034 0.146 -0.101 -0.537 -0.606 -0.565 -0.503 -0.305
3 -0.109 0.007 0.197 0.108 0.146 0.473 0.427 0.178
4 -0.083 0.239 -0.040 -0.609 -0.617 -0.643 -0.637 -0.341
5 0.648 -0.035 0.065 0.515 0.348 0.295 0.479 0.331
6 -0.281 0.128 0.038 -0.491 -0.013 -0.022 -0.454 -0.157
Avg -0.052 0.102 -0.003 -0.277 -0.198 -0.201 -0.220 -0.121
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business services, 4 - Retail services, 5 -
Personal and social services, 6 - Other goods producing industries.
Table 4: Correlation between TFP growth index and Newcomers, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
sector
1 -0.230 -0.195 0.450 -0.825 -0.404 0.292 0.442 -0.067
2 0.061 -0.067 0.235 -0.586 -0.578 0.467 0.454 -0.002
3 -0.022 0.019 -0.305 0.597 0.169 -0.572 -0.470 -0.084
4 -0.051 -0.012 0.259 -0.552 -0.574 0.309 0.472 -0.021
5 0.369 -0.100 -0.261 0.681 0.543 -0.558 -0.284 0.056
6 -0.092 -0.027 -0.111 -0.622 0.055 0.170 0.342 -0.041
Avg 0.006 -0.064 0.045 -0.218 -0.131 0.018 0.159 -0.026
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business
services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal and social services, 6 - Other goods producing industries.
A.3 Data definitions and sources
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Table 5: Correlation between TFP growth index and public ICT, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK avg
sector
1 0.908 0.911 0.966 0.938 0.758 0.760 0.894 0.876
2 0.019 0.852 0.520 0.701 0.637 0.705 0.572 0.572
3 0.272 0.189 -0.851 -0.171 -0.138 -0.726 -0.422 -0.264
4 0.086 0.741 0.361 0.821 0.526 0.670 0.771 0.568
5 -0.953 0.060 -0.540 -0.740 -0.789 -0.547 -0.803 -0.616
6 0.606 0.709 -0.255 0.711 0.066 0.144 0.737 0.388
avg 0.156 0.577 0.034 0.377 0.177 0.168 0.292 0.254
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business
services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal and social services, 6 - Other goods producing industries.
Table 6: Correlation between TFP growth index and Private ICT, 1983-2004
country/ DNK FIN FRA GER ITA NLD UK Avg
sector
1 0.912 0.881 0.781 0.729 0.619 0.663 0.953 0.791
2 0.017 0.654 0.558 0.625 0.287 0.594 0.509 0.463
3 0.167 -0.157 -0.892 -0.298 -0.084 -0.737 -0.229 -0.319
4 0.120 0.714 0.200 0.744 0.568 0.629 0.763 0.534
5 -0.902 0.259 -0.780 -0.740 0.501 -0.574 -0.861 -0.442
6 0.479 0.772 -0.098 0.347 0.281 0.118 0.478 0.340
avg 0.132 0.521 -0.038 0.235 0.362 0.116 0.269 0.228
Note: 1 - Electrical machinery and tele-communication, 2 - Manufacturing, 3 - Finance and business
services, 4 - Retail services, 5 - Personal and social services, 6 - Other goods producing industries.
Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth & Politicians’ mean age, our sample
Source: our calculations based on EURELITE data
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Table 8: Elasticities of TFP growth with respect to Gerontocracy: pooled data and
by sector
Sample Direct effect via gict Indirect effect via ict Total effect
Pooled data (2,803 obs., 1,144 obs., 1,336 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.481*** 0.043 -0.438***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.341*** -0.008 -0.349***
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.313*** -0.002 -0.314***
Electrical machinery and TC (249 obs., 96 obs., 112 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.685*** 0.026 -0.659***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.217 -0.101 -0.116
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.483*** -0.000 -0.483***
Manufacturing (1,290 obs., 480 obs., 560 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.548*** 0.031 -0.516***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.140 0.006 -0.134
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.094 0.001 -0.093
Finance and business services (238 obs., 88 obs., 104 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.826*** 0.495*** -0.330**
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.113 0.021 -0.092
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.147* 0.008 -0.137*
Retail services (468 obs., 192 obs., 224 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.940*** 0.269*** -0.671***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.200* 0.003 -0.197*
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.218** -0.075 -0.294**
Personal and social service (258 obs., 96 obs., 112 obs.)
Sample 1 - 1983:2004 -0.133* -0.012 -0.145**
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.253** -0.088 -0.341**
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.592*** -0.119 -0.711***
Note: Sample 1 includes DNK, FIN, FRA, ITA, NLD and UK from 1983 to 2004. In Sample 2 we add GER but limit
the time period from 1995 to 2004. Sample 3 includes countries of Sample 1 but spans from 1995 to 2004.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
Table 9: Elasticities of TFP growth with respect to Gerontocracy: by country
Country Sample Obs. Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
via gict via ict
Denmark Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 0.254 0.079 0.333
Finland Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 -15.026*** -2.501 -17.528***
France Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 0.038 -0.020 0.172
Germanya Sample 2 - 1995:2004 192 -12.273** - 2.260 -14.533**
Italyb Sample 1 - 1983:2004 415 -4.160*** 0.000 -4.160***
Netherland Sample 1 - 1983:2004 468 -1.312*** 0.919*** -0.393
UK Sample 1 - 1983:2004 480 -1.646*** 0.035 -1.611***
a,b Due to constancy over time, some variables have not been included as controls in the gict equation for Germany and Italy.
Therefore, they are slightly different from those of other countries.
Note: *** Indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
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Table 10: Elasticities of TFP growth with respect to Gerontocracy: comparison
between different models
Sample SUR (I) 2SLS (I)
System of equations (19)-(21)
Sample 1 - 1984:2004 -0.438*** -0.430***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.348*** -0.329***
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.314*** -0.271***
SUR (II) 2SLS (II) 3SLS (II)
System of equations (19), (22), (23)
Sample 1 - 1984:2004 -0.514*** -0.657*** 1.663***
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.397*** -0.333*** 4.218
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.370*** -0.385*** 8.079
SUR (III) 2SLS (III) 3SLS (III)
System of equations (19)-(21) w/o lags
Sample 1 - 1984:2004 -0.241*** -0.129 -0.262**
Sample 3 - 1995:2004 -0.345*** -0.132*** 0.016
Sample 2 - 1995:2004 -0.270*** -0.216** -0.085
Note: *** Indicates significance at the 1% level; ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
Table 11: Data definitions and sources
Variables Source
Gerontocracy related variables
log(gerontocracy) = log of the politicians’ mean age EURELITE
log(newcomers) = log of the newcomers’ mean age EURELITE
background = % of politicians with local/national political backbround EURELITE
female = % of female politicians EURELITE
Growth accounting variables
log(tfp) = log of TFP (value added based) growth (1995=100) EU-KLEMS
log(ict) = log of ICT capital services (1995=100) EU-KLEMS
log(nict) = log of non-ICT capital services (1995=100) EU-KLEMS
log(gict) = log of non-market sector ICT capital services (1995=100) our calculation
on EU-KLEMS
log(hhs) = log of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(hms) = log of hours worked by medium-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(hls) = log of hours worked by low-skilled persons engaged (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
loh(h29) = log of hours worked by persons engaged aged 15-29 (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(h49) = log hours worked by persons engaged aged 29-49 (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
log(h+50) = log of hours worked by persons engaged aged 50 and over (share in total hours) EU-KLEMS
gos = Gross operating surplus (in millions of local currency) EU-KLEMS
log(marketopenness)= log of exports plus Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP PWT 6.1
Education variables
pexpedupe= public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure EUROSTAT
pexpedugdp= public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP EUROSTAT
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Figure 2: Private and public ICT
Source: our calculations
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